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BOOK REVIEWS
Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice , by Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung. Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014. Pp. ix + 157. 
$14.00 (paperback).
W. JAY WOOD, Wheaton College
Caveat lector! Rebecca DeYoung’s clear and penetrating analysis of vain-
glory illuminates some dark places of our inner lives, with the result that 
many readers (this reader at any rate) will see room for moral improve-
ment. Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, follows Glittering Vices, her outstanding 
introduction to the capital vices. Her book length analysis of vainglory, its 
species, causes, poisonous fruits, and potential remedies recapitulates and 
deepens the analysis of vainglory in the earlier book. Why a book-length 
treatment of vainglory rather than one of the other capital vices? Though 
this antique term names an unfamiliar concept, the vice it addresses is 
much in display in our celebrity-crazed, image-obsessed, market-saturated 
society. DeYoung’s rehabilitation of vainglory is much needed and could 
not come at a better time.
The book consists of seven chapters, throughout which DeYoung happily 
acknowledges her indebtedness to the Desert Fathers and, especially, to 
Aquinas. The first two chapters seek to define vainglory and to show its 
roots in the Christian tradition. Chapter 3 differentiates vainglory from 
neighboring concepts, such as pride, vanity, and conceit. Chapter 4 traces 
vainglory’s offspring vices, while chapter 5 explores the temptation genu-
inely excellent persons have to lapse into vainglory. Chapter 6 canvases 
strategies for avoiding and/or conquering vainglory. The seventh and last 
chapter responds to a worry that virtue ethics gives short shrift to grace.
To understand glory that is vain, we must first understand glory. 
Aquinas defines glory as goodness that is “apparent and manifest in its 
splendor.” As DeYoung cleverly puts it, “if anything good is shown and 
known, we’ve got a case of glory” (14). So we call glorious the beauty of a 
sunset, a virtuoso piano performance, and cases of human virtue or moral 
goodness. Of course in the Christian tradition God is preeminently glori-
ous, and all other glory is derivative from God’s. God shares his glory with 
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us as St. Paul makes plain in II Cor. 3:18: “And we, with unveiled faces, 
beholding the glory of God, are being transformed into his likeness, from 
one degree of glory to another.”
DeYoung recognizes that as social creatures, if we are to be known and 
loved, we must be acknowledged and affirmed for who we are and the good 
we do. Without this acknowledgement and encouragement we wouldn’t 
know that we were headed in the right direction. Spiritual mentors must 
approve as well as correct the attitudes and behaviors of those entrusted to 
their care. We must be careful, however, to avoid confusing what DeYoung 
calls “appraisal self respect,” the recognition we receive from our accom-
plishments and successes, with “recognition self-respect,” which is the 
worth and dignity we have as creatures created in God’s image. While 
De Young follows Aquinas’s account of vainglory fairly closely, she is not 
afraid to disagree with the master. “Aquinas’s position seems to discount 
the ways that human beings need acknowledgement and affirmation from 
others to flourish” (138n25). DeYoung reads Aquinas as holding that any 
glory we may have is of instrumental value only, as directed to something 
else, a view she finds “excessively stringent” (138n25).
Chapter 2 chronicles the many ways our pursuit of glory goes awry, 
chiefly because we seek glory for the wrong things, in the wrong way. We 
call things vain that are shallow, trivial, lacking heft and substance. To glory 
in one’s looks, possessions, or athletic prowess is vainglorious, as these lack 
significant and lasting worth. Some seek glory for goods they don’t have, 
and even seek glory for ignoble deeds, as did the youthful Augustine, a 
“notorious vainglorious” as DeYoung puts it (28). Subtler forms of vain-
glory may find us receiving recognition for genuine goods, but growing 
too attached to and dependent upon that recognition. Even when we suc-
cessfully combat one form of vainglory we risk falling into the trap of self 
admiration, thereby succumbing to vainglory in another guise.
If vainglory is an unfamiliar concept, why rehabilitate it? Don’t the 
closely related, more widely used terms “pride” and “vanity” suffice? In 
chapter 3 DeYoung follows the medievals by distinguishing pride, as the 
root source of all capital vices, with vainglory as its first branch. Pride 
seeks position and power in order to be superior over others, even so far 
as to elevate self above God. Vanity, on DeYoung’s view, seeks recognition 
and applause only for shallow things. Vainglory’s chief concern is to dis-
play one’s goodness. “Put simply, the prideful person desires to be greater 
than others, whether one recognizes this or not, while the vainglorious 
person wishes to attract others’ notice and applause, whether she is better 
than them or not” (42). DeYoung admits these are closely intertwined in 
practice. Vainglory’s origins can be found in fear as well as pride. People 
lacking in genuine glory put on masks, insincerely pretending to be some-
thing they are not.
Chapter 4 examines vainglory’s seven offspring vices: boasting, hypoc-
risy, presumption of novelties (having all the latest, coolest gadgets to draw 
attention to oneself), obstinacy, contention, discord, and disobedience. 
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They are means to glory or the effects of pursuing glory as an ultimate 
end. DeYoung’s discussion of hypocrisy is especially insightful. None of us 
are born virtuous, and become virtuous only gradually, by imitating and 
acting like those who are virtuous. Is this hypocrisy a pretense to virtues 
we do not really possess, or as William Miller puts it, a case of “faking it 
till you make it?” Not necessarily. To “put on Christ” as St. Paul bids us, 
is to encourage us toward behavior we wholeheartedly endorse and with 
God’s help hope will one day take up permanent residence in our inner-
most character. This is hardly comparable to the hypocrite whose outward 
persona is adopted solely for the attention it may garner. DeYoung notes 
that the fabulist who invents dishonest stories about himself to gain glory 
may at some point begin to believe his own stories. “What begins as a 
deception of others becomes self-deception” (66). A moral vice thus paves 
the way to an intellectual vice!
The account of magnanimity offered in chapter 5 bears little resem-
blance to Aristotle’s proud, imperious, self-sufficient, and superior person 
who scorns the praise of common folk. Aquinas’s Christian virtue of mag-
nanimity analyzes a trait of persons who acquired virtue and have done 
great acts of virtue, all the while cognizant of their need of God’s grace and 
power. Yet the magnanimous person, as a “spiritual standout” is not free 
of the temptations of vainglory. For great sanctity, displayed in honorable 
and praiseworthy deeds worthy of glory, is likely to win recognition and 
renown. Just here lurks the temptation for the magnanimous person to 
overreach beyond her powers and competence, and to become a little too 
attached to the acclaim her excellence has attracted. Magnanimity remains 
virtuous only if combined with humility.
Chapter 6 asks how we can avoid and/or conquer vainglory. DeYoung 
notes that nearly two millennia of Christian efforts to grow in virtue and 
to combat vice have yielded some tried and true disciplines to help us 
avoid vainglory, most notably, silence and solitude. The struggle to avoid 
seeking attention is made easier when there is no one around to impress. 
Silence gives us less opportunity to toot our own horn, and opens up op-
portunities to listen deeply and attend to others. DeYoung is at pains to 
point out that these disciplines are not part of a Pelagian project of self-
healing. Rather, “the disciplines help to re-align our habits of thought and 
desire in the direction of seeking acknowledgement and affirmation from 
God first and foremost” (100–101).
In the seventh and final chapter, DeYoung responds to the objection 
that a virtues approach to the moral life relies too heavily on human effort 
and not enough on divine grace. In his second letter Peter bids us “make 
every effort to supplement your faith with virtue” because “His divine 
power has given to all things that pertain to life and Godliness” (II Peter 
1: 3–5). Says DeYoung, “this is not working out our own salvation; it is 
working out the faith we have already been given by walking in step with 
the Spirit” (111).
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DeYoung is clearly master of her material, combining clarity, solid schol-
arship, and much wisdom, though she wears it lightly, befitting one who 
has learned from what she has written. She has succeeded at a difficult 
task; to write a book that is accessible to intelligent lay readers, as well as 
offering fresh perspectives for those widely read in the virtue tradition. As 
Aristotle wrote in the Nicomachean Ethics, “Our present discussion does not 
aim, as our others do, at study; for the purpose of our examination is not 
to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry 
would be of no benefit to us” (Book II, Chapter 2, 30; Irwin translation, 
Hackett, 1999). DeYoung’s Vainglory is rich is theoretical insight, but never 
loses sight of virtue’s ultimate purpose for Christians: to become good.
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Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice , by Martha Nuss-
baum. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xii + 315. $24.95 (hardcover).
GLEN PETTIGROVE, University of Auckland
The overarching aim of an academic publication is to contribute to an on-
going conversation in a way that advances the discussion, moving it to-
ward a better understanding of the subject in question. Measured against 
this standard, Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness is a success. It is thought-
ful, articulate, and built on decades of research in ancient philosophy and 
theories of emotion. It will be especially welcome for undergraduates and 
those outside academia who are thinking philosophically about anger or 
forgiveness for the first time. The book is sprinkled with engaging stories 
drawn from literature, history, and personal life that illustrate the argu-
ments she develops and will provide students numerous opportunities to 
see how her theme connects with their daily lives.
However, those already familiar with the philosophical, psychological, 
or theological literature on anger or forgiveness will find the book less 
rewarding. It has the drawbacks associated with being a latecomer to a 
conversation who has not heard most of what has gone before. Or perhaps 
it would be more accurate to say it has the qualities of a work by someone 
who made important contributions to the conversation at some time in 
the past but then wandered into the next room for a while and hasn’t been 
brought up to speed on what was said in her absence.
Building on the cognitive theory of the emotions that she defended 
in Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Nussbaum 
presents an account of anger that focuses on the beliefs and appraisals 
involved in being angry. This is not to say that anger is wholly constituted 
